More Pages From Dantewada (Qalandar’s piece in Outlook)

LINK

[shot from Mrigaya only used for this blog]

The appalling massacre on April 6 of 76 security personnel by Naxal rebels in Chattisgarh has quite naturally generated a lot of media heat. Unfortunately, and in keeping with the celebrity syndrome to which so many of our political conversations fall prey, much of the noise – especially on the internet – has focused on Arundhati Roy’s recent “embedded” piece from the Dantewada frontlines. Running the gamut from Talveen Singh to Salil Tripathi to Shobhaa De, Roy’s critics have driven home the point that, Roy’s advocacy of, if not the Naxalite cause, then at least the necessity of the Naxalite cause, is at best irresponsible and deluded; and at worst, complicit in Naxalite violence. Most notable of all were veteran liberal journalist Barkha Dutt’s April 7 tweets: not content with a dig at Roy (“what would be unbearable is anymore twisted romanticism of the CAUSE. no more 36 page essays on the good folk of dantewada pls”), Dutt even called into question the Indian Air Force’s own apparent reluctance in the face of civilian calls for using air power against the Naxalites (“Air chief may be right in questioning use of air power against ones own people but this attack will have to change the rules of the game”).

I have previously expressed some irritation in response to Roy’s piece from Dantewada not to mention more serious disagreements with her position on the question of azaadi for Kashmir; while nevertheless affirming the essential importance of Roy’s writings on Naxal/Adivasi issues. [The two are not, of course, the same, a point that needs to be stressed. Most of the senior members of the Naxalite movement are not themselves Adivasis (although the rank and file appears to have significant Adivasi representation), and it seems likely that support for the insurgency among Chattisgarh’s forest-based Adivasis is a direct consequence of their utter marginalization by the polity; the Naxalites are often the only organized option by means of which Adivasi concerns may be raised. Moreover, Adivasi marginalization is at least partly – as in the case of Europe’s Roma population – a consequence of cultural factors, and this coincidence – neither traditional Adivasi cultures nor Naxalite/Maoist ideology is reducible to the sort of capitalism much of the rest of Indian society has embraced – also contributes to the alliance between the two. But it is clearly not a necessary conjunction. Roy isn’t always careful with respect to the distinction, and she isn’t the only one, as Dutt’s own “good folk of Dantewada” tweet makes clear (such slippage with respect to, for instance, Muslims, would be unimaginable from Dutt).]

Whatever “side” you find yourself on, you need to read Roy’s piece if you are interested in Indian politics, economic growth (more broadly, the discipline that used to be called “political economy” back in Adam Smith’s day; I’m one of those who wishes it still was), and even global economic growth, with an especial focus on the “extractive”/mining industries. But tweets like Dutt’s are silly, and worryingly so: the severity and scale of this attack makes 36-page essays [1] — whether or not by Roy; in fact, especially by writers others than Roy — on understanding what the Indian state and civil society are up against, more important than ever before.

Recoiling from horror into ignorance is no tribute to the fallen: it is the privilege of those – like virtually everyone who will read this column – whose lives are not at risk. That can’t be said of either the dead jawans or “the good folk of Dantewada”. We do neither any service by reflexively jumping to the view that only an escalation in hostilities (such as the sort of aerial deployment some would have Home Minister Chidambaram assent to), can serve the purpose. Now, more than ever, thoughtfulness is the need of the hour: thoughtfulness in formulating new policies, and a new national politics that does not insist on “us” knowing best what Adivasis want/need/desire; and yes, thoughtfulness in formulating new counter-insurgency strategies as well. (The old one – casually use ill-trained and ill-equipped jawans as cannon fodder, with the slow drip of 2 or 5 or 7 periodically killed occasionally punctuated by news that scores have been murdered in a particularly audacious attack – is clearly not working).

I am not naive, and do not doubt that the Naxalites cannot be beaten without the use of some military force/police action – the April 6 massacre underscores that. But it is a very different thing to sweep aside reflection, debate, and discussion on India’s course of action, in favour of shrill insistence that the world is now Completely New, that the old rules don’t apply, that we simply don’t have time for attempts to understand and engage with the other, and that if we must engage, we must do so quickly, decisively, with not a trace of hesitation. We have heard such calls many times before, whether outside India (most notably, in the aftermath of Al Qaida’s September 11 attacks on the United States) or within it. Stated bluntly, based on the fallout from hasty and ham-handed interventions (e.g., by other countries in Afghanistan and Iraq), the track record of knee-jerk “act first, think later”-types isn’t very good.

Notwithstanding Barkha Dutt’s suggestion that 36 pages might be too long, comprehensive engagement with an issue is not a luxury: such thoughtfulness ought to be the sine qua non of government policy and public discourse. And yes, that does mean paying attention to the Roys of the world, even when the latter aren’t themselves especially nuanced. At least until “civil society” can show alternatives. There is much to disagree with Roy on, not least her reflexive hostility to any position that might entail her coming down on the same side as the Indian government or even public opinion; her blinkers when it comes to violence by the Maoists; or her dismissal of the Indian polity as nothing more than an upper-caste Hindu state – but who else in the mainstream media is writing from the trenches of the ongoing war in Central India? Who else insists that we talk to Adivasis and listen to what they mean by development? Heck, where are the Adivasis in the mainstream media?

Actually, they’re everywhere: typically between the lines of dispatches from the front lines, scrolling the almost daily x or y dead across our TV screens, beaming in names of unfamiliar places: Gadhchiroli. Dantewada. Lalgarh. But that is the only role these Adivasis are permitted, their agency circumscribed by discussions on national security and “development.” Nothing illegitimate about those discussions, just something terribly limiting about them: we already know those arguments; they are ours, and continually parroting them suggests that we need the comfort of heads nodding in agreement (Who would be against “development”? Who doesn’t believe in “tribal uplift”?), not genuine discussion and debate. And yet it is the latter on which the Indian polity depends: for if everyone agreed with “our” received wisdom, the insurgency simply wouldn’t have had the deep roots and endurance that it plainly does. We are not, after all, speaking of a self-sufficient band of rebels dependent on no-one but themselves; even accounting for coercion of local populations, it would be impossible for the Naxals to operate absent large-scale popular support or acquiescence in the relevant areas.

I don’t mean to suggest that Roy is the only activist working to broaden the national conversation on Adivasi-issues. But she is the only one who is able to command national attention and television airtime for her views — and if the cause suffers because of Roy’s position as a lightning rod, she is surely not the only one to blame. Why haven’t other, supposedly less problematic, activists gotten more attention? The sleight of hand here is more than a little cynical: hardly any of the media critics who like to depict Roy as a publicity-hound pay more than lip service to Adivasi politics; and rather than engage with any other activists working in this field (such as the ones Roy is criticized in the abstract for not being like), find it much easier to attack her, leading to a permanent deferral of the substantive issues involved. Roy thus serves a valuable, symbiotic, function for her critics, and for us: because we can attack her instead, we need not talk about the reality staring us in the face. Namely, that the rebellion’s back cannot be broken absent a far-reaching overhaul of the way in which the state treats its most marginal citizens (or, it can be broken, but not consistent with even minimal fidelity to the constitutional norms that serve as India’s promise to her people). We can hold up Roy’s rhetorical excess to public criticism, all the better to avoid squarely facing the reality that Adivasis are disproportionately made to bear the costs of economic development for which they see virtually no benefits. And, in talking about whether or not Roy misrepresents Adivasi voices, we don’t need to ask why our media does not give those voices an opportunity to be heard – and why we don’t demand otherwise.

Heeding Barkha Dutt’s exasperation with Roy’s essays (and even perhaps with the Air Force Chief’s reservations in the face of using air power against the insurgents) will not lead to a Brave New World, simply to one where the “we” of the mainstream media covers press conferences on Operation Green Hunt, or official briefings on Salwa Judum – and where only Roy talks about what the world looks like from Dantewada. Mainstream opinion cannot complain about the nature of her dispatches if it has ceded the terrain. We need more, not fewer, 36-pagers: the massacre of 76 jawans – themselves mostly drawn from some of the poorest segments of Indian society – doesn’t change that reality, it underscores the urgency of understanding the Naxalite point of view, of hearing Adivasi voices that we simply don’t get to hear very much of in the mainstream media. The lives of not just Adivasis in Dantewada, but of many more men like those slaughtered earlier this week, depend on it.

A slightly shorter, edited version of this piece appears in print

29 Responses to “More Pages From Dantewada (Qalandar’s piece in Outlook)”

  1. Congrats on getting your piece into the print edition this time Qalandar. This piece displays all the lucidity and moral clarity that one has come to expect from your writings. Will respond a bit more later.

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  2. Dont know if you will get to see this comment but i have few broad questions,
    1. Engaging with who? My guess is a struggle like this which has gone on for a long time would have been taken over by the political hue than the real earnest issue of the adivasis right to their land and their protection. So they would no longer be willing to negotiate and would only want their solution. EVen their call for talks before would have been just for getting the time required for preparation of an attack than anything else.
    2. That arundhati roy’s piece was difficult to read not because she was trying to portray a opinion contrary to government – we have had several articles in the main stream media with true kashmiri voice – it was difficult to read because in the few pages i was able to read – i could only see arundhati’s voice( which is simple – anti india) than the true projection of the people. IF it is indeed their in the article, a reader like me needs to really cross through her ugly writing(that is no eloquent way to put it – but she is honestly not a good political writer).
    3. LTTE’s defeat has some lessons for us. Even though I do side with the tamils(note not the LTTE).

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    • Thanks for the comment/questions sachita. I will definitely get back to these and respond (am running late for a b-day party; since I missed the party the last two years running, my credibility is low! :-))

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    • Re: “1. Engaging with who? My guess is a struggle like this which has gone on for a long time would have been taken over by the political hue than the real earnest issue of the adivasis right to their land and their protection. So they would no longer be willing to negotiate and would only want their solution. EVen their call for talks before would have been just for getting the time required for preparation of an attack than anything else.”

      Even if this is true, it would be true of every political struggle that has gone on for a long time, and cannot be used as a reaosn to avoid engagement. We can’t wait until those who purport to represent adivasi interests (assuming, for the sake of argument, that Naxalites do; that is hardly an uncontroversial claim, and in any event is not even arguably true in every part of India) begin to manifest purity of motive or intention. Such purity cannot be found anywhere, certainly not where “we” are concerned. I guess what I’m saying is that while I do not necessarily disagree with what you are saying, I would argue that we can’t let that prevent us from reaching out.

      Your other point presents a tougher problem: i.e., while I do not think it is necessarily the case that Naxalites “would no longer be willing to negotiate”, it is certainly POSSIBLE that might happen. But I would also argue that to the extent they do go down that route, they are likely to face pressure from “constituents” who are less absolutist. [The chances of that will be reduced if the Naxalites are running an authoritarian state where dissent can be stifled. Not to mention that the state government/security forces/Salwa Judums of the world hardly have stellar records themselves.]

      Re: “3. LTTE’s defeat has some lessons for us. Even though I do side with the tamils(note not the LTTE).”

      Yes. And there are lessons both ways: the LTTE’s refusal to accept political reality; refusal to work seriously towards a negotiated solution; and (less important point) failure to adjust to the post-9/11 world, doomed them in the long run. Be careful of sending an uncompromising message — as the state can then be incentivized to becoming a twin.

      But there is a second lesson too: the defeat of the LTTE has not led to a great flowering of democracy in Sri Lanka; in fact, while we are all thankful the conflict is over, democracy in Sri Lanka seems more threatened than ever before, with the Rajapakse clan concocting a toxic brew of nepotism, authoritarianism, and cult of personality. This is a very troubling situation for all Sri Lankans, Sinhalese as well as Tamils. If war-hero Fonseca can be treated this way, then no-one is safe. The lesson for the world is a simple one: be careful of winning at all costs; one might not like what one becomes in order to secure victory.

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    • Q, one thing that this article in the above link points out is the ‘Wall of Silence’ enforced by both the Naxalites and the State, which restricts actual reporting of any incidents in this conflict.

      To quote:
      “the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act (Jan Suraksha Kanoon as it is commonly known) makes it unlawful for anyone to write or utter words that can create danger for public order, peace and public tranquility. At least two journalists have been jailed for writing accounts of violence unleashed by the Salwa Judum. While the cases were dismissed later, they want to remain anonymous because they have received threats. Even criticism of the state’s policies can invite wrath.
      Maoists, too, have their own definition and have killed villagers on suspicion of being informers.”

      Roy probably has become an eminence grise for the Naxals, and is tolerated as well as finds an entrenched position to report out of there. Maybe other journos who are neutral have no takers, and realistically cannot do their job without inviting harm from either side on themselves.

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  3. Bravo,Q.
    I have absolutely no time for Arundhati Roy.
    Unfortunately ,struggles like this are exploited by all concerned and solutions
    are always elusive, not in the least because very often the parties involved are not even working towards a solution. Adivasi cause is a victim of this Maoist movement. It is a political game. Roy’s position on all and sundry issues are flawed to put it kindly. She is a misguided publicity hound.
    Someone,please shoot me if I read 36 words of her writing, let alone 36 pages.
    I wish I had your moral clarity, Q. I can never hope for your lucidity. But, I feel at this time the insurgency needs to be crushed with all the might Indai can summon.

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  4. I had refused to read Roy’s (or anything written by her) piece in outlook due to my prejudices against her. After reading your piece I tried reading it and couple of pages into reading it I gave up. It was so one sided with out critical analysis that I felt redeemed with attestation of my views about her.

    I am not sure even with engaging tribals, these people are going to give up arms. And it is not a problem which showed up yesterday.Contrary to what Roy tried to convey, Maoists are well armed (If you have AKs, landmine). I do see the point that Adivasis have point of view and administartion needs to listen to them but taking up arms is no solution. In my opinion any one who wants to talk with arms should be crushed.

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  5. alex adams Says:

    Excellent write up there!
    The bottom line for me- If ANYONE is picking up the gun and indulging in violence IRRESPECTIVE of the cause- it can be dealt with ONLY BY FORCE-there are NO two ways or ambiguity about it.
    Nw whether it neeeds air power or sea power -that is immaterial.
    if the stage is reached, that air power is being considered- only highlights the need of power and that there has already been a delay.
    The “genuine adivasi” problem appears to be just a part of this conglomerate. Other elements have obviously hijacked this one to their own ends.
    The other problem of “engagement” is the real risk of opening a “can of worms” and other elements having “genuine concerns” also picking up arms to gain attention. This route has to be discouraged.
    In a big complex country like india, genuine grievances are quite expected and understandable-but giving a tacit approval to any violence will be a wrong signal.
    Just like there is no “good” or “bad” terrorist, there is no grievance whih justifies killing innocent people.
    Now, i come to the crux of this issue (and other). i have long lamented about the “soft state mentality” india has developed into. This label has to be avoided like plague.
    Another example-david headley-for months-an out of date crap photograph of headly was being shown on indian channels. Forget about gettng access- a proper photo was not provided to india by the USA. would usa have been so blaze about the whole issue if he was an al qaida operative who had damaged us interests directly!
    This “double agent” business also sounds fishy and feel that usa has something to hide here.
    Coming to the likes of arundhati roy-i wont waste any time and suggest no sane people does. The likes of roy and even nandita das , is a fast developing breed who have nothing but nuisance value-to be short and precise!
    Pardon the non-complementary reference but could not resist-Being politically incorrect deliberately, but have come across some bengali females, in my dealings and place of work, who have exhibited similar “irritating” behaviour. Is it just coinicidence, or is it someting about bengali females( have no problems with the poor bengali males and incidentally have many good bengali friends). Feel the best way out wihth these isto give them the royal ignore and not discuss their “enlightened views” in fora and blogs.
    Another unrelated topic- i think india is far too concerned with the north western borders whilst i think the real challenge right now is from the north. The issue of stapled visas, arunachal and massive influx of chinese goods is just the tip of the iceberg. Also, the maoist movements both in india ad neighbouring nepal clearly have the chinese foootprint.
    Even in europe and around the world, the massive influx of cheap chinese goods have disturbed the equilibrium of indigenous businesses. The problem is that even the usa is not in a state to openly take on china at this stage.
    I am not advocating going into open confrontation but to adopt a state of prepared vigilance. ultimately , might is right, and the best solution to these problems is to enhance one’s strength and capabilities quietly. Diplomacy is a choice only for the strong; for the weak, it is just the only option but not a choice…

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  6. Q your articles are always elegantly, smartly written but this piece carries a rage which is beautifully ironic (and I mean this entirely as a compliment) given what you’re calling for here. This is one of your most compelling and nuanced and rather propulsive reads (personally speaking it was a kind of hypnotic moment in the middle of a day of work) and needless to say there’s a universality that’s really appealing here. The moral framework applies to much more than this specific situation (a passing mention of the US experience is key here) and I’d urge just about anyone to pick this up.

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  7. alex adams Says:

    Qalandar seems to be almost blushing-paani paani ho gaya!

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  8. alex adams Says:

    “Let us have no illusions about what they (Naxals) want. It is seizure of political power. The People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army will be converted into People’s Liberation Army,” Chidambaram said.
    Feel the same about this myself.
    The (genuine) adivasi issue is just an excuse. This has been overtaken by familiar anti-national forces and is being hijacked elsewhere.
    The aim is nothing short of total seziure of power, ultimately.
    This should be nipped in the bud with ALL force at the disposal ( although it does not seem to be a”bud” any longer)

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  9. I returned to your piece, Q, after having watched Raavan.

    “Namely, that the rebellion’s back cannot be broken absent a far-reaching overhaul of the way in which the state treats its most marginal citizens (or, it can be broken, but not consistent with even minimal fidelity to the constitutional norms that serve as India’s promise to her people).”

    This line stands out especially as the last image we have in this film is what such a “war” would boil down to if the “back is to be broken.” A column of Indian military, armed to the teeth, mowing down a single, unarmed man.

    Beera is never given a political program in this film in an explicit sense but the more I think about Abhishek’s insistence in interview after interview that the fictional Lal Maati is in “central India” (speaking of Lal Maati one remembers Roy’s evocative description of the “red earth” in Dantewara) the name “Munda” tagged onto the promotional materials (but only once used in the film) and the vague political declarations that the central characters make with regard to their plight, the more one gets a sense of something very important being said here. Ratnam doesn’t make it easy on his audience to dig in to find this train of thought, but for those willing to look and take a ride, it really frames this issue in a resonant (if underdeveloped) way…

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    • Well said. To be honest, I deliberately stayed away from Dantewada/Naxalism in my Raavan review, because I felt it was so slight (i.e. in other films people have complained Rathnam deals with political issues superficially; here that charge isn’ fair, as I felt he barely deals with it at all — and the poor chap got criticized for that too!). However, I think this political angle is a lot more fleshed out in Raavanan. And that led me to look at even Raavan in a new light: I had earlier been looking at the whole thing wrong, by seeking to “find” the references to Naxalism. But actually, as your comment intuits, Rathnam is interested in the other side of the coin: abuse of state organs, abuse by the righteous, and so on. And on that there is plenty of material in both films (recall Dev’s speech at the police parade; even more sinister in the Hindi version, and almost a cruel refraction of Saamy’s Vikram for those of us who love that film!) — that’s why Beera/Veeraiya don’t need to be given explicit political programs; the police is certainly given explicit oppression. It is a parallel movement to the one in Dil Se. Rathnam is interested in the state’s failures (not, a la Arundhati Roy, because he expects nothing from the state; but because, like a patriotic liberal, he expects better from it).

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      • Very well put all around.

        “that’s why Beera/Veeraiya don’t need to be given explicit political programs; the police is certainly given explicit oppression”

        This sums it up perfectly. Again, on this score I prefer the Hindi version’s coding not only because of its obvious cultural resonance in terms of where this takes place but also because, as you put it, not everything’s spelled out.

        For me Ratnam’s always the filmmaker who’s relies on an impressionistic style in order to achieve political (sometimes emotional, sometimes both) effect. He’s never blatant, never specific not simply because he’s not the mind for it but because he chooses to be. My sense is that the ellipses and vagueness of Raavan is more in line with the same in movies like Dil Se… and of course Iruvar.

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